Predicting Network Controllability Robustness: A Convolutional Neural
  Network Approach by Lou, Yang et al.
HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.1109/TCYB.2020.3013251 (SEPTEMBER 2020) 1
Predicting Network Controllability Robustness:
A Convolutional Neural Network Approach
Yang Lou, Yaodong He, Lin Wang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Guanrong Chen, Life Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Network controllability measures how well a net-
worked system can be controlled to a target state, and its robust-
ness reflects how well the system can maintain the controllability
against malicious attacks by means of node-removals or edge-
removals. The measure of network controllability is quantified
by the number of external control inputs needed to recover or to
retain the controllability after the occurrence of an unexpected
attack. The measure of the network controllability robustness, on
the other hand, is quantified by a sequence of values that record
the remaining controllability of the network after a sequence of
attacks. Traditionally, the controllability robustness is determined
by attack simulations, which is computationally time consuming.
In this paper, a method to predict the controllability robustness
based on machine learning using a convolutional neural network
is proposed, motivated by the observations that 1) there is
no clear correlation between the topological features and the
controllability robustness of a general network, 2) the adjacency
matrix of a network can be regarded as a gray-scale image, and 3)
the convolutional neural network technique has proved successful
in image processing without human intervention. Under the new
framework, a fairly large number of training data generated by
simulations are used to train a convolutional neural network for
predicting the controllability robustness according to the input
network-adjacency matrices, without performing conventional
attack simulations. Extensive experimental studies were carried
out, which demonstrate that the proposed framework for predict-
ing controllability robustness of different network configurations
is accurate and reliable with very low overheads.
Index Terms—Complex network, convolutional neural net-
work, controllability, robustness, performance prediction.
I. INTRODUCTION
COMPLEX networks have gained wide popularity andrapid development during the last two decades. Scientific
research on this subject was pursued with great efforts from
various scientific and engineering communities, which has
literally become a self-contained discipline interconnecting
network science, systems engineering, statistical physics, ap-
plied mathematics and social sciences alike [1]–[3].
Recently, the network controllability issue has become a
focal topic in complex network studies [4]–[13], where the
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concept of controllability refers to the ability of a network
in moving from any initial state to any target state under an
admissible control input within a finite duration of time. It
was shown that identifying the minimum number of exter-
nal control inputs (recalled driver nodes) to achieve a full
control of a directed network amounts to searching for the
maximum matching of the network, known as the structural
controllability [4]. Along the same line of research, in [5], an
efficient tool to assess the state controllability of a large-scale
network is suggested. In [7], it reveals that random networks
are controllable by an infinitesimal fraction of driver nodes,
if both of its minimum in-degree and out-degree are greater
than two. In [6], it demonstrates that clustering and modularity
have no discernible impact on the network controllability,
while degree correlations have certain effects. The network
controllability of some canonical graph models is studied quite
thoroughly in [14]. Moreover, the controllability of multi-
input/multi-output networked systems is studied in [9], [15].
A comprehensive overview of the subject is available in the
recent survey papers [16], [17].
Meanwhile, malicious attacks on complex networks is a
main concerned issue today [18]–[23]. Reportedly, degree-
based node attacks, by means of removing nodes with high
degrees, are more destructive than random attacks on net-
work controllability over directed random-graph and scale-
free networks [24]. The underlying hierarchical structure of
such a network leads to the effective random upstream (or
downstream) attack, which removes the hierarchical upstream
(or downstream) node of a randomly picked one, since this
attack removes more hubs than a random attack [21]. Both
random and intentional edge-removal attacks have also been
studied by many. In [25], for example, it shows that the
intentional edge-removal attack by removing highly-loaded
edges is very effective in reducing the network controllability.
It is moreover observed (e.g., in [26]) that intentional edge-
based attacks are usually able to trigger cascading failures
in scale-free networks but not necessarily in random-graph
networks. These observations have motivated some recent in-
depth studies of the robustness of network controllability [27].
In this regard, both random and intentional attacks as well as
both node- and edge-removal attacks were investigated in the
past few years. In particular, it was found that redundant edges,
which are not included in any of the maximum matchings, can
be rewired or re-directed so as to possibly enlarge a maximum
matching such that the needed number of driver nodes is
reduced [28], [29].
Although the correlation between network topology and
network controllability has been investigated, there is no
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prominent theoretical indicator or performance index that can
well describe the controllability robustness with this measure.
Under different attack methods, the controllability robustness
behaves differently. The essence of different attack methods
leads to different definitions of importance of nodes (or
edges). Generally, degree and betweenness are commonly used
measures for importance [24]. In [21], a control centrality is
defined to measure the importance of nodes, discovering that
the upstream (or downstream) neighbors of a node are usually
more (or less) important than the node itself. Interestingly, it
was recently found that the existence of special motifs such as
rings and chains is beneficial for enhancing the controllability
robustness [27], [30], [31].
On the other hand, in machine learning, deep neural net-
works have shown powerful capability in performing clas-
sification and regression tasks. Compared to the canonical
neural networks that involve human-defined features, deep
neural networks entirely ignore these requirements, thus lower
down the risk of being misled by possibly biased human
interference. For example, given an image classification task,
a deep neural network works based only on the results of
processing the raw image pixels, rather than human-defined
features such as colors and textures. Convolutional neural
network (CNN) is a kind of effective deep neural network. In
a CNN, the convolutional layer consists of a set of learnable
filters (called kernels) [32], and through a forward pass the
well-trained filters are convolved with the input image maps.
This structure is able to automatically analyze inner features
of a dataset without human interference. Successful real-
world applications of CNNs include text recognition and
classification [33]–[35], speech recognition [36], [37], and
question answering [38], [39] in natural language processing;
image and video classifications [40], [41], face recognition
and detection [42], and person re-identification [43], [44]
for performing vision tasks. Applications of CNNs have also
been extended to biomedical image segmentation [45], patient-
specific electrocardiogram classification [46], etc.
In the literature, the measure of network controllability is
quantified by the number of external controllers needed to
recover or to retain the controllability after the occurrence of
a malicious attack. The measure of the network controllability
robustness is quantified by a sequence of values that record the
remaining controllability of the network after a sequence of
attacks. Usually, the controllability robustness is determined by
attack simulation, which however is computationally time con-
suming. In this paper, a method to predict the controllability
robustness using a CNN is proposed, based on the observations
that there is no clear correlation between the topological
features and the controllability robustness of a network, and
the CNN technique has been successful in image processing
without human intervention while a network adjacency matrix
can be represented as a gray-scale image. Specifically, for a
given adjacency matrix with 0-1 elements, representing an un-
weighted network, it is first converted to a black-white image;
while for a weighted network with real-valued elements in
the adjacency matrix, a gray-scale image is plotted. Examples
of the converted images for both weighted and unweighted
images are shown in Fig. 1, where different network topologies
show distinguished patterns. The resulting images are then
processed (for either training or testing) by a CNN, where
the input is the raw image (adjacency matrix) and the output
is referred to as a controllability curve against the probability
of attacks. Given an N -node network, a controllability curve
is used to indicate the controllability of the remaining net-
work after i (i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1) nodes (or edges) were
removed. No feature of the adjacency matrix is assumed to
have any correlation with the controllability robustness. Given
a sufficiently large number of training samples, the CNN can
be well trained for the purpose of prediction. Each sample
(either for training or testing) consists of an input-output pair,
i.e., a pair of an adjacency matrix and a controllability curve.
Compared to the traditional network attack simulations, the
proposed method costs significantly less time to obtain an
accurate controllability robustness measure of a given network,
of any size and any type, with low overheads in training.
The performance of the proposed framework is also very
encouraging, as further discussed in the experiments section
below.
The rest part of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews the network controllability and controllability
robustness against various attacks. Section III introduces the
convolutional neural network used in this work. In Section IV,
experimental study is performed and analyzed. Finally, Section
V concludes the investigation.
II. NETWORK CONTROLLABILITY
Given a linear time-invariant (LTI) networked system de-
scribed by x˙ = Ax+Bu, where A and B are constant matrices
of compatible dimensions, the system is state controllable if
and only if the controllability matrix [B AB A2B · · ·AN−1B]
has a full row-rank, where N is the dimension of A. The
concept of structural controllability is a slight generalization
dealing with two parameterized matrices A and B, in which
the parameters characterize the structure of the underlying
networked system. If there are specific parameter values that
can ensure the LTI system described by the two parameterized
matrices be state controllable, then the underlying networked
system is structurally controllable.
The network controllability is measured by the density of
the driver nodes, nD, defined by
nD ≡ ND/N , (1)
where ND is the number of driver nodes needed to retain the
network controllability after the occurrence of an attack to the
network, and N is the current network size, which does not
change during an edge-removal attack but would be reduced
by a node-removal attack. Under this measure, the smaller the
nD value is, the more robust the network controllability will
be.
Recall that a network is sparse if the number of edges M
(or the number of nonzero elements of the adjacency matrix)
is much less than the possible maximum number of edges,
Mmax. For a directed network, Mmax can be calculated by
Mmax = N · (N − 1) . (2)
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(a) unweighted ER (b) unweighted SF (c) unweighted QSN (d) unweighted SW
(e) weighted ER (f) weighted SF (g) weighted QSN (h) weighted SW
Fig. 1: An example of adjacency matrix converting images for both weighted and unweighted images. The network size
N = 50 with average degree 〈k〉 = 5. In each image, a black pixel represents a 0 element in the adjacency matrix; a white
pixel represents a 1 element in the unweighted network. For an weighted network, the non-zero elements are normalized
∈ (0, 1] to form a gray-scale image.
Practically, if M/Mmax ≤ 0.05, then it is considered as a
sparse network.
For state controllability, if the adjacency matrix A of the
network is sparse, the number ND of driver nodes can be
calculated by [5]
ND = max{1, N − rank(A)}. (3)
If it has a full rank, then the number of driver nodes is ND =
1; otherwise, ND = N − rank(A) diver nodes are needed,
which should be properly assigned (to fill the deficiency of
the matrix rank).
As for structural controllability, according to the minimum
inputs theorem [4], when a maximum matching is found, the
number of driver nodes ND is determined by the number of
unmatched nodes, i.e.,
ND = max{1, N − |E∗|}, (4)
where |E∗| is the cardinal number of elements in the maximum
matching E∗. In a directed network, a matching is a set
of edges that do not share common start or end nodes. A
maximum matching is a matching that contains the largest
possible number of edges, which cannot be further extended.
A node is matched if it is the end of an edge in the matching;
otherwise, it is unmatched. A perfect matching is a matching
that matches all nodes in the network. If a network has a
perfect matching, then the number of driver nodes is ND = 1
and the driver node can be any node; otherwise, the needed
ND = N − |E∗| control inputs should be put at those
unmatched nodes.
The robustness of both state and structural controllabilities
is reflected by the value of nD calculated according to Eq.
(1) and recorded after each node or edge is removed. In this
paper, for brevity, only node-removal attacks are discussed.
III. CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORKS
The CNN to be used for controllability performance pre-
diction consists of an embedding layer, several groups of con-
volutional layers, and some fully connected layers. Rectified
linear unit (ReLU) is employed as the activation function and
max pooling is used to reduce the dimensions of datasets.
TABLE I: Parameter settings of the seven groups of convolu-
tional layers.
Group Layer Kernelsize Stride
Output
channel
Group 1 Conv7-64 7x7 1 64Max2 2x2 2 64
Group 2 Conv5-64 5x5 1 64Max2 2x2 2 64
Group 3 Conv3-128 3x3 1 128Max2 2x2 2 128
Group 4 Conv3-128 3x3 1 128Max2 2x2 2 128
Group 5 Conv3-256 3x3 1 256Max2 2x2 2 256
Group 6 Conv3-256 3x3 1 256Max2 2x2 2 256
Group 7 Conv3-512 3x3 1 512Max2 2x2 2 512
The framework of CNN is shown in Fig. 2. The detailed
parameter settings of the 7 groups of convolutional layers
are given in Table I. Here, the CNN architecture follows the
Visual Geometry Group (VGG)1) architecture [47]. Compared
with the original CNN architectures, the VGG architecture
incorporates a smaller kernel size and a greater network depth.
Thus, in this architecture, most kernels have small sizes (2×2
or 3 × 3). The convolution stride is set to 1 and the pooling
stride is set to 2.
1http://www.robots.ox.ac.uk/∼vgg/
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embedding 
sparse data 
N × N 
dense data 
N × N 
FM 1 
N1 × N1 ×64 
FM 2 
N2 × N2 ×64 
FM 3 
N3 × N3 ×128 
FM 4 
N4 × N4 ×128 
FM 5 
N5 × N5 ×256 
FM 6 
N6 × N6 ×256 
FM 7 
N7 × N7 ×512 
FC 1 
1× NFC1  
FC 2 
1× NFC2  
prediction 
1 × (N−1) 
convolution 
and ReLU 
max pooling concatenation fully connected 
and ReLU 
Fig. 2: The architecture of the CNN used for controllability robustness prediction, where FM is an abbreviation for feature
map, and FC for fully connected. The data size Ni = dN/(i + 1)e, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 7. The concatenation layer reshapes the
matrix to a vector, from FM 7 to FC 1, i.e., NFC1 = N7×N7×512. NFC2 is a hyperparameter and NFC2 ∈ (NFC1, N −1).
Set NFC2 = 4096 for N = 800, 1000, and 1200, in this paper.
Given the input as an N×N sparse matrix with less than 5%
of non-zero elements but more than 95% zeros. If the network
is unweighted then further assume that the input to the CNN
is a sparse one-hot matrix, namely a 0-1 matrix that contains
less than Mmax×5% 1-elements. According to [48], however,
deep neural network performs poorly on this type of data, and
thus the input data will be converted to normal dense data via
the embedding layer for better performances. An embedding
layer is a randomly generated normalized matrix, which has
a size N ×N here. The converted matrix A′ = AD becomes
a dense one, where A is the original sparse (one-hot) matrix
and D is the embedding matrix.
As shown in Fig. 2, following the preprocessing embedding
layer, there are 7 feature map (FM) processing layers, denoted
as FM 1 to FM 7. Each FM processing layer consists of a
convolution layer, a ReLU, and a max pooling layer.
Convolutional layers are used in the hidden layers because
they can more efficiently deal with large-scale datasets (e.g.,
1000 × 1000 pixel images), while fully-connected layers are
more suitable for small-sized datasets such as MNIST2 images
(an MNIST image has 28 × 28 pixels). The size of a real
complex network generally varies from hundreds (e.g., there
are 279 non-pharyngeal neurons in the sensory system of the
worm C. elegans [49]) to billions (e.g., 5.5 billions of pages
in the World Wide Web3). In Section IV, the network size for
simulation will be set to 1000, and thus the convolutional lay-
ers are employed instead of fully-connected layers. Compared
to the fully-connected layers, using the convolutional layers
can significantly reduce the number of parameters. Meanwhile,
the number of FM groups will be set to 7, since the input
size is around 1000× 1000 in the following experiments. The
number of FM groups should be set to be greater for a larger
input dataset, and vice versa.
ReLU provides a commonly-used activation function that
defines the non-negative part of a set of inputs. It has been
proved performing the best on 2D data [50]. The formation
2http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
3https://www.worldwidewebsize.com/ (Accessed: 20 May, 2020)
of ReLU to be used here is f(x) = max{0, x}. The output of
each hidden layer, i.e., a multiplication of weights, is summed
up and rectified by a ReLU for the next layer.
Pooling layers reduce the dimensions of the datasets for
the input of the following layer. There are two commonly-
used pooling methods, namely the max pooling and average
pooling. The former uses the maximum value (a greater value
represents a brighter pixel in a gray-scale image) within the
current window, while the latter uses the average value. Max
pooling is useful when the background of the image is dark.
Since the interest here is only in the lighter pixels, the max
pooling is adopted.
Following the 7 convolutional groups, there are two fully-
connected layers. The last feature map, FM 7, is concatenated
to FC 1, and thus the input size of FC 1 is equal to the number
of elements of the FM 7 output, which is N7×N7×512. The
size of FC 2 is a hyper-parameter that should be set to be
within the range NFC2 ∈ (NFC1, N − 1).
The loss function used is equal to the mean-squared error
between the predicted vector (referred to as a controllability
curve) and the true vector, as follows:
L = 1
N − 1
N−1∑
i=1
||pvi − tvi||, (5)
where || · || is the Euclidean norm, pvi is the ith element of
the predicted curve, and tvi is the ith element of the true
controllability curve. The training process for the CNN aims
to minimize the loss function (5). Source codes of this work
are available for the public4.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Four representative directed networks, each has weighted
or unweighted edges, are examined. They are Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
random graph (ER) [51], generic scale-free (SF) network [24],
[52], [53], q-snapback network (QSN) [27], and Newman–
Watts small-world (SW) network [54].
4https://fylou.github.io/sourcecode.html
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Specifically, the edges in the ER network are added com-
pletely at random, where the direction of each edge is evenly-
randomly assigned. The edges of SF network are generated
according to their weights defined by
wi = (i+ θ)
−σ, i = 1, 2, . . . , N, (6)
where σ ∈ [0, 1) and θ  N . Two nodes i and j (i 6= j,
i, j = 1, 2, ..., N ) are randomly picked with a probability
proportional to the weights wi and wj , respectively. Then, an
edge Aij from i to j is added (if the two nodes are already
connected, do nothing). The resulting SF network has a power-
law distribution k−γ , where k is the degree variable, with
constant γ = 1 + 1σ , which is independent of θ. In this paper,
σ is set to 0.999, such that the power-law distribution has a
reasonable scaling exponent γ = 2.001. The QSN has one
layer, rq , generated with a backbone chain and multiple snap-
back edges created for each node i = rq + 1, rq + 2, . . . , N ,
which connects backward to the previously-appeared nodes
i − l × rq (l = 1, 2, . . . , bi/rqc), with the same probability
q ∈ [0, 1] [27]. The SW network is initiated by a directed
ring with K = 2 nearest-neighbors connected, i.e., a node i
is connected to nodes i− 1, i+ 1, i− 2 and i+ 2, via edges
Ai−1,i, Ai,i+1, Ai−2,i and Ai,i+2. Then, adding or removing
edges, until the predefined number of edges is reached.
For each network topology, unweighted networks are stud-
ied in Subsection IV-A and weighted networks are studied in
Subsection IV-B. The adjacency matrix is represented by
Ai,j =
{
0, no edge connecting i to j,
e, otherwise.
(7)
where e = rand(0, 1] representing a random real value for a
weighted network; e = 1 for a unweighted network. Examples
of images that are converted from weighted or unweighted
networks are shown in Fig. 1.
Resizing (upsampling or subsampling) is commonly used
for CNNs to process inputs with different sizes. However,
therein the application scenario is different. For example,
portrait photos can be properly resized, without disturbing the
task of object recognition. However, a pixel here represents
an edge in the network, and thus resizing will change the
original topology, thereby misleading the task of prediction.
There are a few works that deal with different network sizes
by using the same CNN, with additional assumptions. For
example, in [55], to generate an input sequence for a network
of any size, a sequence of nodes that covers large parts
of the network should be searched first, and moreover the
local neighborhood structure has to be assumed. In this paper,
CNNs are used to process both raw and complete structures of
complex networks, without any assumption or prior knowledge
on network structural features, and thus the input size is fixed
to be same as the size of the input network. Due to space
limitation, only node-removal attacks are considered in this
paper.
The node-removal attack methods include: 1) random at-
tack (RA) that removes randomly-selected nodes; 2) targeted
betweenness-based attack (TBA) that removes nodes with
maximum betweenness; and 3) targeted degree-based attack
(TDA) that removes nodes with maximum node degree. For
TBA and TDA, when two or more nodes have the same max-
imum value of betweenness or degree, one node is randomly
picked to remove.
The experiments are run on a PC with 64-bit operation
system, installed Intel i7-6700 (3.4 GHz) CPU, GeForce GTX
1080 Ti GPU. The CNN is implemented in TensorFlow5 that
is a Python-friendly open source library.
A. Controllability Curve Prediction
First, unweighted networks of size N = 1000 are consid-
ered. For each network topology, four average (out-)degree
values are set, namely 〈k〉 = 2, 〈k〉 = 5, 〈k〉 = 8, and
〈k〉 = 10. Since the networks are unweighted, only the
structural controllability (see Eq. (4)) is discussed here. In
Subsection IV-B, state controllability (see Eq. (3)) is measured
for the weighted networks discussed therein. The reason is
that the structural controllability is independent of the edge
weights, while the state controllability depend on them.
For CNN training and testing, with each of the three attack
methods, there are 1000 randomly generated instances for each
network configuration, amongst which 800 instances are used
for training, 100 instances for cross validation, and the other
100 instances for testing. Taking RA for example, there are
4(topologies) × 4(〈k〉 values) × 800 instances used for CNN
training; 4× 4× 100 instances used for cross validation; and
4×4×100 instances used for testing. The number of training
epochs is empirically set to 10 in these simulations. For each
training epoch, the CNN is trained by the full set of training
data in a shuffled order. To prevent over-fitting, after running
an epoch, the trained CNN is evaluated by the full set of
validation data. The best-performing structure on the validation
data is then selected as the optimum structure. The Adam
optimizer [56] is used to optimize the CNN, i.e., to minimize
the loss function defined in Eq. (5). The learning rate of Adam
is set to 0.005. The first momentum, the second momentum
and the  of Adam follow the recommended settings, which
are 0.9, 0.999 and 1× 10−8, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the testing results on RA. The results
of TBA and TDA are shown in Figs. S1 and S2 of the
supplementary information (SI)6. In these figures, results of
the same topology with different average degrees are aligned
in a row. The average degree increases from left to right on
each row. The red curve shows the predicted value (pv) given
by the CNN; the dotted blue line represents the true value (tv)
obtained from simulations; the black curve shows the error
(er) between the prediction and the true value; and the green
dotted line represents the standard deviation of the true value
(st), used as reference. For each curve of pv, tv, and er, the
shaded shadow in the same color shows the standard deviation,
while the standard deviation curve st does not contain such a
shadow.
It can be seen from these figures that different network
topologies show different controllability curves against the
same attacks. For QSN and SW, since there is a directed-chain
5https://www.tensorflow.org/
6https://fylou.github.io/pdf/pcrsi.pdf
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in QSN and a connected global loop in SW, the initial number
of needed external controllers is 1, hence the controllability
curves start from 10−3. In contrast, there is no such a structure
in ER or SF, thus their curves start from much higher than
10−3. From left to right, as the average degree increases, 1)
the positions of all curves become lower, which means less
controllers are needed, and the controllability consequently
becomes better, throughout the entire attack process; 2) the
initial positions of ER and SF curves become lower, but for
QSN and SW, their initial positions remain the same at 10−3.
Generally, both er and st increase as the number of removed
nodes increases. The two curves er and st generally match
each other, which means that the prediction error and the
standard deviation of the testing data roughly have the same
magnitude. Even in some cases, er is less than st mostly
throughout the attack process (e.g., shown by Fig. 3(f)), when
the tv and pv values approach 1, both er and st curves drop
drastically.
The predicted controllability curves become rugged for
the two homogeneous random graphs, ER and SW, in the
initial stage of RA. As 〈k〉 increases, the ruggedness of
controllability curves increase as well. This is because the
topological characteristics (the unknown features abstracted
by CNN itself) of the homogeneous networks can only be
mildly influenced by the change of average degree. In the
latter stage of RA, the predicted controllability curves match
the true curves smoothly. In contrast, SF is a heterogeneous
network while QSN has a uniform degree distribution; both
topologies have stronger topological characteristics and thus
the predicted curves and true curves are matched smoothly. As
shown in the converted gray-scale image examples (see Fig. 1),
SF images have a strong characteristic, where the light pixels
(representing edges) are converged in the upper-left corner.
Except for the black upper-right triangle and the backbone-
chain, the rest light pixels in QSN are uniformly randomly
distributed. Similarly, except for the backbone directed trian-
gles, the rest light pixels in SW are also uniformly randomly
distributed. There are substantial numbers of light pixels in
ER, QSN, and SW, which are uniformly randomly distributed
in the images.
Figures S1 and S2 in SI show the results on TBA and
TDA, respectively. Similarly, the predicted curves and the true
curves are smoothly matched for both SF and QSN, while the
predicted curves are rugged for both ER and SW in the initial
stage of an attack, especially as 〈k〉 increases. It is worth
mentioning that in Figs. S1(c), S1(d), S1(n), S1(o), S1(p),
and Figs. S2(c), S2(d), S2(m), S2(n), S2(o), S2(p), the pv
curves cannot well match the tv curves at the very beginning
of the process, i.e., at the initial positions. This means that the
controllability robustness of homogeneous networks are more
difficult to predict than that on heterogeneous networks and
QSN, which have stronger topological features. Meanwhile,
the controllability performance prediction on TBA and TDA
is also slightly more difficult than that on RA. Although the
er values in the rugged part is relatively small (compared to
the other parts of the curve), they are nevertheless greater than
the st values.
Note that, during CNN training, networks with different
topologies and different average degrees are trained together.
The controllability performance prediction is not specified
for any particular network topology with a specified average
degree. As for an attack method, it can also be integrated into
the training data. However, here the focus is on predicting
the controllability curves, rather than predicting the attack
method, hence different attack methods are trained and tested
separately.
As shown in Figs. 3, and Figs. S1 and S2 in SI that the value
of er is visibly as small as the standard deviation of the testing
data, which include 100 testing samples. In Table II, the mean
error is compared to the mean standard deviation of the testing
data under RA. The mean error e¯r is further averaged over the
999 data points, i.e., e¯r equals the average value of a whole
er curve. The mean standard deviation σ¯ is the mean of the
standard deviations calculated on PN = i (i = 1, 2, . . . , N−1,
N = 1000), i.e., the average value of a whole st curve. As
can be seen from the table, the e¯r values are less than or
equal to the σ¯ values in most cases, indicating that the overall
prediction error is very small, thus the prediction of the CNN
is very precise. The comparisons under TBA and TDA are
presented in Table S1 of SI.
TABLE II: The mean error of prediction vs. the mean standard
deviation of the testing data for the unweighted networks under
RA.
〈k〉 = 2 〈k〉 = 5 〈k〉 = 8 〈k〉 = 10
RA
ER e¯r 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.011
σ¯ 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.013
SF e¯r 0.018 0.020 0.023 0.024
σ¯ 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.026
QSN e¯r 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.012
σ¯ 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.013
SW e¯r 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.011
σ¯ 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.012
B. Extension of Experiments
The previous subsection has demonstrated that the (struc-
tural) controllability robustness performance of various net-
works, with different average degrees under different attacks,
can be well predicted. Here, the experiments are further
extended to predict state controllability curves of weighted
networks, with network size set to N = 800, 1000, and
1200, respectively. For each network size setting, a new CNN
is trained. The average degree is fixed to 〈k〉 = 10. The
CNN structure and configurations remain the same as in the
experiments reported in Subsection IV-A, where only the input
and output sizes are modified.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 4 and Table III.
Fig. 4 shows that the prediction error er remains low when the
network size is varied from 800, to 1000, then to 1200. Once
again, in Table III the comparison between the mean error e¯r
of the results and the mean standard deviation σ¯ of the testing
data shows very high precision of the prediction.
The extensibility of the trained CNN is investigated, when
the networks of the training and testing sets have different
average degrees. The CNN trained in Subsection IV-A (for
RA) is reused here without further training, where unweighted
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Fig. 3: [Color online] Results of CNN controllability curve prediction under random attacks. PN represents the number of
nodes having been removed from the network; nD is calculated by Eqs. (1) and (4).
TABLE III: The mean error of prediction vs. the mean standard
deviation of the testing data for the weighted networks.
N = 800 N = 1000 N = 1200
RA
ER e¯r 0.013 0.014 0.010
σ¯ 0.014 0.013 0.011
SF e¯r 0.025 0.022 0.021
σ¯ 0.031 0.028 0.025
QSN e¯r 0.014 0.014 0.011
σ¯ 0.016 0.014 0.012
SW e¯r 0.014 0.012 0.010
σ¯ 0.013 0.012 0.011
networks with average degrees 〈k〉 = 2, 5, 8, and 10 respec-
tively, are employed. Then, the CNN is used to predict the
controllability robustness for the networks with 〈k〉 = 3 and 7
respectively. The network size is N = 1000 and the structural
controllability is calculated. Compared to Fig. 3, where the
training and testing data are drawn from the same distribution,
when the training and testing data have different distributions,
the prediction performances of ER (Figs. 5(a) and (e)), QSN
(Figs. 5(c) and (g)), and SW (Figs. 5(d) and (h)) are clearly
worse. In contrast, the controllability robustness of SF (Figs.
5(b) and (f)) can be well predicted. Table IV shows that, for
ER, QSN, and SW, the mean errors of prediction e¯r are about
2 to 4 times greater than the mean standard deviations σ¯ of
the testing data; while for SF, the prediction reaches a very
low mean error that is close to σ¯.
It is remarked that, when the training and testing data are
drawn from different distributions, a more suitable machine
learning technique might be transfer learning [57].
Finally, consider different sizes of training data in the
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Fig. 4: [Color online] Results of CNN controllability curve prediction on weighted networks under different attacks. PN
represents the number of nodes having been removed from the network; nD is calculated by Eqs. (1) and (3).
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA ER - hki=3
er
st
pv
tv
(a)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA SF - hki=3
(b)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA QSN - hki=3
(c)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA SW - hki=3
(d)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA ER - hki=7
(e)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA SF - hki=7
(f)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA QSN - hki=7
(g)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
PN
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
n D
RA SW - hki=7
(h)
Fig. 5: [Color online] Results of CNN controllability curve prediction on unweighted networks with 〈k〉 = 3 and 7 respectively,
under random attacks. The CNN is trained in the same way as that in Fig. 3 (〈k〉 = 2, 5, 8, and 10). PN represents the number
of nodes removed from the network; nD is calculated by Eqs. (1) and (4).
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Fig. 6: [Color online] Results of CNN controllability curve prediction under random attacks. The size of training data is set
to 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100% of the data size used in the paper, where 100% represents a training set of 800 instances. The
average degree is set to 〈k〉 = 8.
TABLE IV: The mean error of prediction vs. the mean
standard deviation, where the training and testing data have
different average degrees.
〈k〉 = 3 〈k〉 = 7
RA
ER er 0.058 0.023
σ¯ 0.020 0.016
SF e¯r 0.025 0.022
σ¯ 0.024 0.027
QSN e¯r 0.044 0.063
σ¯ 0.016 0.015
SW e¯r 0.037 0.026
σ¯ 0.015 0.014
settings of Subsection IV-A, where 800 training instances are
employed for each topology with a given 〈k〉. Next, the size
of training data is reduced to 40%, 60%, and 80% of that,
respectively. Meanwhile, the data sizes of cross validation set
and testing set remain the same.
Figure 6 shows the prediction results when 〈k〉 = 8. It can
be seen that a smaller size of training data does not influence
the prediction performance for SF and QSN, but clearly influ-
ences the results for ER and SW. This is because SF and QSN
have strong topological characteristics. A full set of prediction
results for the four network topologies with 〈k〉 = 2, 5, 8, and
10, are shown in Figs. S3–S6, respectively. The average error
comparison is presented in Table S2. It is revealed that, if a
network has strong topological characteristics (e.g., SF and
QSN), or if its average degree is low (e.g., 〈k〉 = 2), then a
small training data size can be used; otherwise, a setting as in
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Subsection IV-A is recommended.
C. Computational Costs
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Fig. 7: The convergence process of loss value calculated by
Eq. (5) during the CNN training of (a) RA; (b) TBA; and (c)
TDA. The horizontal axis ‘Training’ represents the number of
instances trained. The red curve represents the exponentially
weighted averages (with β = 0.9) for reference. There are 10
epochs in total. In each epoch, 4×4×800 = 12800 instances
are trained.
Given an N -node network without self-loops and multiple
links, there could be N · (N − 1) directed edges at most. For
sparse networks considered here, with a small average degree
〈k〉 = a, there are aN edges in total, with (N ·(N−1)aN ) possible
combinations. This shows the impossibility of exhaustively
enumerating all possible networks with fixed size and average
degree. Further, with a given adjacency matrix at hand, the
simulation to measure its controllability robustness is non-
trivial. The simulation process should be iterated for N − 1
times. At each time step t, when t nodes have been removed,
the major computational cost includes: 1) to find the node with
the maximum betweenness or degree among the present N−t
nodes; 2) to calculate the current controllability, using Eq. (3)
or Eq. (4), both are time-consuming in traditional simulation.
Empirically, given a PC with configuration as introduced
above, the elapsed time is about 90 seconds for a QSN with
N = 1000 and 〈k〉 = 10 under the attack by TDA, to collect
a controllability robustness curve by simulation. In contrast, it
needs less than 0.2 seconds to get a controllability robustness
predicted curve by a well-trained CNN. The training overhead
is also low, which costs less than 5 hours to train a CNN using
4× 4× 800 samples. The convergence process of loss values
is plotted in Fig. 7. An example of run time comparison is
available with source codes7.
In summary, it is not only effective, but also efficient to train
a CNN and then use it to predict the network controllability
robustness.
7https://fylou.github.io/sourcecode.html
V. CONCLUSIONS
Network controllability robustness, which reflects how well
a networked system can maintain a full control under various
malicious attacks, can be measured via attack simulations,
which returns the true values of the controllability robustness
but is computationally costly and time consuming in con-
ventional approaches. In this paper, the convolutional neural
network is employed to predict the controllability robustness,
which returns encouraging results, in the sense that the predic-
tion error is of the same magnitude as the standard deviation
of the data samples, with attractively low computational costs.
Convolutional neural network is adopted in this study, for the
following reasons: 1) no network topological features have
been found and reported in the literature, to provide a clear
correlation with the controllability robustness measure; 2) the
adjacency matrix of a complex network can be processed as a
gray-scale image; 3) convolutional neural network technique
has been successfully applied to image processing where
no clear feature-label correlations are given in advance. The
present study has confirmed that convolutional neural network
is indeed an excellent choice for predicting the complex
network controllability robustness. In this study, extensive
experimental simulations were carried out to predict the con-
trollability robustness of four typical network topologies, in
both weighted and unweighted settings, with different network
sizes and average degrees. For all cases, the convolutional
neural network tool is proved to provide accurate and reliable
predictions of the controllability robustness for all simulated
networks under different kinds of malicious attacks. Future
research aims to develop analytic methods for in-depth studies
of the controllability robustness and other related issues in
general complex networks.
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